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Executive summary
  In most democratic states, the mechanisms for constitutional 
change are clearly separated from mechanisms for 
enacting other (‘ordinary’) legislation and are designed to 
make any significant alteration in existing constitutional 
arrangements a relatively difficult undertaking. In Britain 
there is no legislative process for constitutional change 
other than ordinary legislation, nor is there any clear or 
generally agreed distinction between constitutional and 
other laws. The potential shortcomings of this approach 
have become increasingly evident in the period since 1997. 
Constitutional modification is now an established part of 
every government’s legislative programme. In this paper we 
address legislative means of changing the constitution.
  Most significant legislative changes to the constitution are 
contained in primary legislation. There is a convention 
that, after being introduced into Parliament, bills of ‘first 
class constitutional importance’ are referred in their 
committee stage, by the government’s business managers, 
to a Committee of the Whole House rather than a public 
bill committee. Decisions as to whether a piece of legislation 
is of first class constitutional importance are not subject 
to any evident consistent underlying principle. They 
are made by the government which introduces the bill 
into Parliament; apparently subject to no parliamentary 
procedure for questioning such determinations; and, as 
proceedings in Parliament, they are not justiciable. It is not 
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clear that consideration by a Committee of the Whole House 
necessarily leads to more effective scrutiny.
  In Thoburn v Sunderland City Council (2002) Lord Justice 
Laws argued that the common law had in recent years come 
to recognise a new category of ‘constitutional statute’ which 
is not subject to implied repeal.
  There are principled arguments for distinguishing certain 
legislation as being of a fundamental or constitutional 
nature. The Constitution Society has argued that such a 
distinction should be made as part of legislative procedure. 
The government does not agree with this line of thinking. 
The government’s sole (principled) objection to the idea of 
special procedures for constitutional legislation appears to 
be the problem of definition. Therefore, early in 2012 the 
Constitution Society set up a working party of distinguished 
academics to attempt to find a definition of constitutional 
legislation which might command general acceptance.
  Examples of ways in which constitutional measures 
might be treated differently include: special procedures 
(pre-legislative, legislative or post-legislative), special 
restrictions on amendment / repeal, special interpretative 
techniques, ministerial statements, and prohibitions on 
waiving the requirement for consultation and pre-legislative 
scrutiny on grounds of alleged urgency and on introducing 
constitutional bills in the first term of a new Parliament.
  The passage into law of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 
2011 provides a valuable insight into the shortcomings of 
the current approach to major constitutional legislation. 
It demonstrates that the government may bring about 
substantial constitutional change at high speed, and with 
no meaningful prior consultation on the details, even 
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when such change lacks a clear electoral mandate, making 
the constitution subordinate to narrow party political 
considerations. This lack of a considered, inclusive process 
to constitutional change is undesirable from the point of 
view of principle. It prevents the thorough examination of 
the precise way such change is brought about, potentially 
harming its quality, and the wider constitutional environment 
at the time. There is a need for a mechanism which prevents 
the constitution from being subject to the political agenda 
of the government of the day and provides for proper 
consultation and scrutiny.
  The government’s principled argument against special 
procedures for constitutional legislation rests on the 
problem of defining what should be subject to special 
treatment. There are at least three alternative approaches to 
the definition of constitutional legislation. The Commons 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee has 
recommended that the government applies a test of whether 
the legislation in question affects a principle part of the 
constitution, and raises an important issue of principle, 
with reference to a list prepared by Professor Sir John Baker 
of constitutional subject matter.
  An alternative method of distinguishing constitutional 
legislation is certification. The practice in the United 
Kingdom Parliament of referring bills of first class 
constitutional importance to a Committee of the Whole 
House relies on a form of certification, but when viewed 
from this perspective, its shortcomings are evident.
  The modest proposal advanced in this paper is to 
abandon any attempt at an exhaustive definition of first 
class constitutional legislation, but instead to empower 
a committee in each House first, to determine whether a 
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bill contains provisions of constitutional significance and, 
secondly, to propose ways in which those provisions should 
be dealt with. The principal advantage of such a procedure 
would be its flexibility.
  Several existing committees might be considered suitable 
for this role but it might be best to establish new committees 
specifically for this purpose.
  The principal power any such committee would need would 
be a power to put down procedural motions and amendments 
concerning how the House deals with a bill. It might also be 
necessary to empower the committee to be able to force onto 
the agenda a motion to delay consideration of the second 
reading for a short period to allow it properly to consider 
a bill. Further, in order to allow a period of consultation 
on the principle of the bill itself, rather than merely on its 
detailed provisions, one might want the committee to have a 
power to put down and have debated a motion before second 
reading that there should be a public reading stage on a bill. 
The precise content of the committee’s proposals should be a 
matter for the committee itself.
  One obvious objection to the proposal is that it would make 
no difference. In the Commons, the committee would reflect 
the political composition of the House and so would normally 
have a majority of government supporters; and would only 
be able to propose motions and amendments to the House. 
But the point should not be taken too far. Recent parliaments 
have seen a remarkable rise in backbench rebelliousness. The 
influence of a committee with the power to propose motions 
and amendments would be important. Even if a government 
feels that it has to reject the committee’s recommendations 
and is able to fight off any rebellion, it would have been 
drawn into explicit and extensive debate on the issues.
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  Another objection to establishing such a committee would 
be practicality: whether the committee would be able to do 
its job in time or whether undue delay might be caused for 
bills of no constitutional significance. But the objection is 
not a strong one. In relation to secondary legislation, the 
existing Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee already 
examines such legislation and could be asked to raise issues 
of constitutional significance. There is no reason in principle 
why private members’ bills should be excluded from the 
committees’ scope; but the relevant committee could have 
discretion to spend no time on bills with little chance of 
receiving a second reading.
  The remaining objection to the proposal is that it has no 
chance of being adopted by government because it involves 
giving power away. Governments rarely support reforms of 
this kind. However, the means now exist for effecting such 
a change without the government’s support: the Backbench 
Business Committee. All that is really required is sufficient 
political will from members themselves.
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Distinguishing constitutional 
legislation: a modest proposal
Introduction
1. In most democratic states, the mechanisms for constitutional 
change are clearly separated from mechanisms for enacting 
other (‘ordinary’) legislation and are designed to make any 
significant alteration in existing constitutional arrangements 
a relatively difficult undertaking. The pervasiveness of these 
provisions is not accidental. The legitimacy of a democratic 
political system rests on a generally held belief that all 
political interests must play by a consistent set of rules 
which are generally regarded as fair and cannot be easily 
manipulated for political advantage. In most democracies 
constitutional changes are made infrequently, and only when 
there is a broad consensus, normally extending beyond the 
government of the day, that the existing arrangements are 
significantly defective.
2. In Britain there is no legislative process for constitutional 
change other than ordinary legislation, nor is there any clear 
or generally agreed distinction between constitutional and 
other laws. The potential shortcomings of this approach 
have become increasingly evident in the period since 1997 
which has been marked by frequent, sometimes hectic, 
constitutional change. The Blair government undertook an 
extensive programme of piecemeal constitutional reform, 
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intended in part to demonstrate its modernising credentials 
and bolster popular confidence in the political system 
generally. Since 2010, the Coalition government has also 
pursued a busy programme of constitutional legislation, 
much of it arguably intended mainly to cement the political 
bargain between the Coalition partners.
3. Constitutional modification, whether it is seen as well-
intentioned and considered reform or self-serving or idle 
tinkering, is now an established part of every government’s 
legislative programme. There is no reason to believe that 
future governments will break the habit. Constitutional 
horse-trading of the type embodied in the 2010 Coalition 
Agreement may become a regular feature of future coalition 
governments. A report of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution in 2011 summarised the 
current situation in these terms:
There are a number of weaknesses inherent in the current 
practice of legislating for constitutional change: lack of 
constraints on the government, failure to have regard to 
the wider constitutional settlement, lack of coherence 
within government, lack of consistency in the application 
of different processes, changes being rushed and lack of 
consultation. These weaknesses arise out of the fact that 
the United Kingdom has no agreed process for significant 
constitutional change.1
4. However both Parliament and the courts have, in specific 
contexts, recognised a distinction between ‘constitutional’ 
and ‘ordinary’ legislation.
1 15th Report, July 2011, The Process of Constitutional Change, para 51.
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5. In this paper we address legislative means of changing the 
constitution, though we acknowledge that the constitution 
may be altered through changes of practice or in convention, 
often dictated by the government of the day.
Parliamentary process
6. Most significant legislative changes to the constitution 
are contained in Acts of Parliament; primary legislation. 
However constitutional changes can also be introduced 
through subordinate legislation issued under the power of 
a parent Act. Such legislation may in some circumstances 
amend or repeal primary legislation.
7. In the case of primary legislation, there is a convention that, 
after being introduced into Parliament, bills of ‘first class 
constitutional importance’ are referred in their committee 
stage to a Committee of the Whole House rather than a 
public bill committee.2 The decision to refer bills in this 
way is made by the government’s business managers. In 
2006 Professor Robert Hazell at the UCL Constitution Unit 
examined bills introduced in the eight years after the 1997 
election and concluded that there was no evident consistent 
principle underlying these decisions.3 There is no reason 
to believe that things have changed much since then. The 
decision as to whether a piece of legislation is of first class 
constitutional importance is made by the government 
which introduces the bill into Parliament. There appears 
to be no parliamentary procedure for questioning these 
2 Erskine May: Parliamentary Practice (24th edition: Butterworths, 2011), p 555.
3 Hazell R, Time for a new Convention: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Constitutional 
Bills 1997–2005, Public Law, Summer 2006, from p247.
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determinations and, as proceedings in Parliament, they are 
not justiciable. A 2013 report of the House of Commons 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (‘PCRC’) 
concluded that:
The current ad hoc process of identifying which bills to take 
on the Floor of the House of Commons in a Committee 
of the whole House lacks transparency: it is clear that 
differentiation is taking place in order to decide which bills 
are to be considered by a Committee of the whole House, 
but the decision-making process is unclear.4
8. It is not clear that consideration by a Committee of the 
Whole House necessarily results in more effective scrutiny 
of bills of first class constitutional importance. While 
all Members have an opportunity to participate in the 
committee stage, the extent of the debate will often be 
constrained by timetable considerations.
9. Subordinate legislation, contained in statutory instruments, 
is subject to a lower level of parliamentary control or 
scrutiny than primary legislation. No specific mechanism 
exists for marking out subordinate legislation as requiring 
special treatment on constitutional grounds. However, 
the system of committees in both Houses does allow for 
statutory instruments to be brought to the attention of 
Parliament, and for consideration of their merits, allowing 
for the possibility of consideration of constitutional issues. 
There is also provision for scrutiny of European legislation, 
which may in some cases also be of arguable constitutional 
significance.
4 PCRC, First Report of Session 2013–14, May 2013, Ensuring standards in the 
quality of legislation, para 142.
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The Thoburn case
10. In Thoburn v Sunderland City Council (2002)5 (the ‘Metric 
Martyrs’ case) Lord Justice Laws remarked that the common 
law had in recent years come to recognise a new category of 
legal provision which is not subject to implied repeal:
In the present state of its maturity the common law has 
come to recognise that there exist rights which should 
properly be classified as constitutional or fundamental 
[…] And from this a further insight follows. We should 
recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were 
“ordinary” statutes and “constitutional” statutes. The two 
categories must be distinguished on a principled basis.
Laws L.J.’s statement was obiter: subsequent judgments have 
neither amplified nor disavowed his remarks, but they could 
point to a gradual and wider shift of attitudes within the 
judiciary.
Why are constitutional laws different?
11. In states with codified constitutions the distinction between 
constitutional and general legislation is explicit: whatever 
is provided for in the constitution is constitutional. In the 
absence of a constitutional document there are nonetheless 
principled arguments for distinguishing certain legislation 
as being of a fundamental or constitutional nature.
12. Public acceptance of legitimate authority rests on a belief in 
the existence of an overarching body of rules which frame the 
political arena. If elected governments too often seem to amend 
5 [2003] QB 151.
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these rules in a self-interested way then trust in the legitimacy 
of the political system may be progressively undermined.
In Sir Jeffrey Jowell’s words:6
… the constitution provides the rules of the game, the 
framework for all official decisions. If these decisions are 
to be accepted as legitimate, even though you may not 
agree with them, then the framework of decision-making 
must command respect and general acquiescence.
13. In evidence to PCRC’s recent inquiry into legislative 
standards, The Constitution Society argued that a category 
of legislation should be distinguished as constitutional on 
three grounds:7
  Constitutional legislation is the architecture of 
the state. The elements of the constitution are 
unavoidably interconnected, so an alteration in 
one part of the ‘building’ can have unforeseen 
consequences in other parts.
  Most major constitutional legislation has an 
effective presumption of irreversibility.
  A practice has arisen under the current 
government of incorporating provisions 
in constitutional legislation which impose 
restrictions on future Parliaments.8
6 House of Lords Constitution Committee, 15th Report, July 2011, The Process 
of Constitutional Change, para 52.
7 First Report of Session 2013–14, May 2013, Ensuring standards in the quality 
of legislation, para 135.
8 There are two examples: the ‘referendum locks’ in the European Union 
Act 2011 and the supermajority provision in section 2 of the Fixed-term 
Parliaments Act 2011.
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14. The government does not agree with this line of thinking, 
arguing in the conclusion to its response to the 2011 Lords 
Constitution Committee report:
It is intrinsic in the United Kingdom’s constitutional 
arrangements that we do not have special procedures for 
dealing with constitutional reform. Comparing processes 
in the United Kingdom with those in other countries which 
do have written constitutions and special procedures for 
reform of those constitutions is therefore of limited value. 
The first stumbling point, as the Committee has itself 
noted, is the problem of the definition of what should be 
subject to special treatment.9
As the response does not enumerate further stumbling 
points, we may conclude that the government’s sole, or 
at least sole principled objection to the idea of special 
procedures for constitutional legislation is the problem of 
definition.
The government reiterated these views in July 2013 in its 
response to PCRC’s report on legislative standards:
The Government does not accept that it would be helpful 
to seek to define “constitutional” legislation, nor that it 
should automatically be subject to a different standard of 
scrutiny.10
The Government does not agree with the Committee’s 
assertion that “constitutional law is qualitatively 
9 The Government Response to the House of Lords Constitution Committee 
Report, The Process of Constitutional Change, September 2011, para 27.
10 The Government Response to the House of Commons Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee Report, Ensuring standards in the quality 
of legislation, para 58.
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different from other types of legislation”. Constitutional 
legislation, like all legislation, varies in its importance, 
complexity and impact … Current legislative processes 
provide sufficient flexibility to allow an assessment to 
be made on the bill in question and the Government to 
propose the appropriate method and level of scrutiny.11
15. In early 2012 The Constitution Society set up a working 
party of distinguished academics12 to attempt to find 
a definition of constitutional legislation which might 
command general acceptance. The problem of definition is 
discussed at paragraphs 24–30 below.
How might constitutional measures be treated differently?
16. The Society’s working party has identified the respects in 
which a category of constitutional law might in principle be 
subject to special treatment:
Six possible (but not exhaustive) reasons for wanting to 
establish a special category of constitutional legislation 
would be (i) deciding what sorts of measures require a 
special pre-legislative procedure, (ii) deciding what sorts 
of measures require a special legislative procedure, (iii) 
deciding what sorts of measures require a special post-
legislative procedure, (iv) deciding what sorts of measures 
require special restrictions on subsequent amendment 
and/or repeal, (v) deciding what sorts of measures should 
be subject to special interpretative techniques, and (vi) 
deciding what sorts of measures should give rise to 
11 Ibid, para 60.
12 The members of the working party are: Prof Sir John Baker, Dr Andrew Blick, 
Prof Linda Colley, Prof David Feldman, Richard Gordon QC, Mr David 
Howarth (Chair), Nat le Roux, Lord Maclennan of Rogart.
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special interpretative techniques being imposed on other 
legislation. We suggest that the boundary-line between 
constitutional and other legislation might be drawn in 
different places according to the purpose for which one is 
seeking to make the distinction.13
17. In its 2011 Report, the Lords Constitution Committee14 
recommended that the minister responsible for introducing 
a bill in either House should make a written ministerial 
statement setting out whether, in the minister’s view, the bill 
provides for significant constitutional change and, if so:
  what is the impact of the proposals upon the existing 
constitutional arrangements;
  whether and, if so, how the government engaged with the 
public in the initial development of the policy proposals 
and what was the outcome of that public engagement;
  in what way were the detailed policies contained in 
the bill subjected to rigorous scrutiny in the Cabinet 
committee system;
  whether a green paper was published, what consultation 
took place on the proposals, including with the devolved 
institutions, and the extent to which the government 
agree or disagree with the responses given;
  whether a white paper was published and whether 
pre-legislative scrutiny was undertaken and the extent 
to which the government agree or disagree with the 
outcome of that process;
13 Feldman D and Howarth D, internal paper, 2013.
14 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 15th Report, July 2011, 
The Process of Constitutional Change, paras 71–72.
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  what is the justification for any referendum held, or to 
be held, on the proposals;
  and when and how the legislation, if passed, will be 
subject to post-legislative scrutiny.
18. The Constitution Society has argued15 that enhanced 
legislative standards should be applied to constitutional 
bills and in particular that the requirement for consultation 
and pre-legislative scrutiny should not be waived on 
grounds of alleged urgency if a bill is constitutional. It 
might similarly be argued that constitutional bills should 
not be introduced in the first term of a new Parliament, 
especially if the proposed legislation was not foreshadowed 
in the government’s election manifesto.
19. The passage into law of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 
2011 provides a valuable insight into the shortcomings of 
the current approach to major constitutional legislation.
Case study: the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011
Content and constitutional significance of the Act
20. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 created a regular 
timetable for general elections to take place every five years, 
on the first Thursday in May. Previously, within a five-year 
limit, prime ministers were able to request a dissolution 
from the monarch under the Royal Prerogative. They 
were thereby able to determine the timing of the General 
15 le Roux N, June 2012, oral evidence to PCRC inquiry into Ensuring standards 
in the quality of legislation.
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Election, subject to a broad convention that the power 
should not be abused. The new arrangements established by 
the Act provided for early dissolutions in two circumstances. 
The first trigger was two thirds of MPs in the Commons 
(including vacant seats) voting for a General Election. The 
second occurred if the Commons passed – on a simple 
majority – a motion of no confidence in a government, and 
a new government could not win a confidence vote within 
14 days.
21. The Act was of the highest constitutional significance for a 
number of reasons:
  The subject matter of the Act, involving the 
duration of the elected component of the UK 
legislature and the means by which it may be 
dissolved, was of first order importance. In a 
country which possessed a written constitution, 
the document would surely deal with this issue, 
and any changes to the arrangements involved 
would be subject to whatever amendment 
procedures the constitution itself prescribed;
  The Act effected an important formal 
constitutional change. It transferred the power 
to dissolve Parliament in advance of the five-
year maximum term-length from a Royal 
Prerogative to a statutory basis (s.3 [2]);
  The Act brought about another significant 
formal constitutional change through creating 
a statutory basis for the Commons to express its 
confidence or lack thereof in the government 
of the day. It also specified that the loss of a 
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confidence vote would lead to an early General 
Election, unless a government was able to win 
a confidence vote within a 14 day time-limit 
(s.3 [3–5]) Previously processes surrounding 
confidence votes existed on a basis of 
convention;
  The Act potentially engaged the absolute 
veto of the House of Lords, one of the closest 
equivalents to a constitutional amendment 
procedure in the UK. Under the Act prime 
ministers could, by order, move the date 
of the General Election up to two months 
beyond the regular five-year limit it created 
(s.1 [5]). Consequently when passing through 
Parliament as a Bill it was exempt from the 
restrictions on the powers of the House of 
Lords contained in the Parliament Act.16 
Previous changes engaging the residual 
Lords legislative veto since the passing 
of the Parliament Act in 1911 involved 
temporary extensions of Parliament during 
the emergency circumstances of world war; 
and received all-party support. On this 
occasion, the measure – though it would not 
inevitably lead to parliaments of longer than 
five years, and then only by a maximum of two 
months – was permanent. It did not address 
an emergency, and did not command the 
consensus that the wartime extensions of the 
length of Parliament had.
16 See Parliament Act 1911 s.2(1).
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  The Act had consequences for the electoral 
timetable of different tiers of government, 
leading to delays by a year in the forthcoming 
elections to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh 
Assembly (ss.4–5), to avoid their coincidence 
with a UK General Election;
  The Act introduced a novel procedure for a 
supermajority in the House of Commons as a 
means of triggering an early General Election 
(s.2 [1], [2]);
  The Act dealt with a subject in which reformers 
had been interested for a number of years, 
arguing that there were grounds for democratic 
improvement. A number of those who 
agreed with the broad principle of fixed-term 
parliaments objected to particular components 
of the Act, including the setting of the length of 
a Parliament at five years, which many saw as 
excessively long.
Genesis and scrutiny of the Act
22. The Liberal Democrat manifesto of 2010 pledged to 
introduce ‘fixed-parliaments to ensure that the Prime 
Minister of the day cannot change the date of an election 
to suit themselves’.17 The Conservative Party however was 
not committed to this policy and during the previous 
parliament a Labour minister had talked out a private 
17 Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010 (Liberal Democrat Party: London, 2010), 
p88.
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member’s bill proposing a version of it.18 Consequently, in 
as far as the electoral mandate is regarded as a means of 
legitimising constitutional reform proposals, it is difficult 
to use in support of the manner in which this Act passed 
into law.
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 arose from the 
negotiations between the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats that followed the inconclusive General 
Election of May 2010 and led to the formation of the 
Coalition government. In The Coalition: our programme for 
government, the new government committed to establish 
‘five year fixed-term Parliaments’, but with provision for 
earlier dissolution subject to the support of at least 55 per 
cent of the Commons, equal to the combined strength of 
the two Coalition parties.19 After protests the 55 per cent 
was increased to two thirds.
23. The Act was, therefore, driven by the political imperatives 
of the Coalition, which regarded its implementation as 
urgent. Indeed without it, the Coalition might have been 
highly unstable in its early stages and might have failed 
entirely. The pace with which it passed into law was itself 
of very great political importance since the bill was a 
crucial confidence building measure, without which the 
junior partner might have interpreted every occasion on 
which the senior partner made difficulties as a prelude 
18 HC Deb,16 May 2008, col 1703 at col 1719. One of the authors declares 
his interest as the sponsor of that bill. He still maintains that his bill, 
which provided for no way of cutting short a parliament except by passing 
a repealing or amending statute, was superior to that passed in 2011.
19 The Coalition: our programme for government (HM Government: London, 
2011), p26.
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to engineering a crisis and calling a General Election. 
But the process by which it passed into law was a subject 
of criticism. There was no green or white paper, and no 
meaningful pre-legislative scrutiny. The House of Commons 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee complained 
that the Bill was ‘ill-thought through’ and ‘rushed’.20 The 
Committee argued that ideally the Bill would command 
‘political consensus’. Although there was a genuine political 
urgency behind the proposal, it was certainly possible for 
the government to have proposed the reform in two parts; 
an urgent Bill that applied only to the current parliament, 
which would have had the desired political effect, and a 
second Bill making the change permanent, which could 
indeed have been preceded by a draft Bill or other forms of 
wider consultation. The House of Lords Select Committee 
on the Constitution complained that the
speed with which the policy was introduced, with no 
significant consultation, no green paper and no detailed 
assessment of the pros and cons of a five year term over 
a four year term, suggests that short-term considerations 
were the drivers behind the Bill’s introduction.21
24. Beyond the most common complaint about the five year 
term, both committees and other observers highlighted 
possible concerns about the design of the Bill, that could 
perhaps have been addressed better at a consultation or full 
pre-legislative stage. The issues raised included a lack of 
clarity around the confidence vote concept, and the danger 
20 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Fixed-
term Parliaments Bill, HC 436 2010–11 (Stationery Office: London, 2010), p5.
21 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fixed-term Parliaments 
Bill, HL 69 2010–11 (Stationery Office: London, 2010), p9.
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that the provision for early elections could be abused for 
partisan ends.
Conclusion
25. A number of conclusions can be drawn from this case study.
First, it is possible for the government of the day to bring 
about substantial constitutional change at high speed, and 
with no meaningful prior consultation on the details, even 
when such change lacks a clear electoral mandate. The 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was by any standard of 
major constitutional significance on a number of grounds. 
Parliamentary committees judged it to be an important 
piece of constitutional legislation, and expressed regret at 
the haste with which it was implemented.
Second, the potential for legislating in this way may make 
the constitution subordinate to narrow party political 
considerations. The key drivers in this case were the 
requirements of the Coalition agreement and the parties to it.
Third, this lack of a considered, inclusive process is 
undesirable from the point of view of principle.
Fourth, this approach to constitutional change prevents 
the thorough examination of the precise way it is brought 
about, including by those who are generally supportive of 
the measure, potentially harming its quality. The Fixed-
term Parliament Act 2011 might have been better designed 
if a different approach had been taken.
Fifth, such legislation can be introduced without regard 
to the wider constitutional environment within which it 
25DISTINGUISHING CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION
operates, for instance the connection between this Act and 
the House of Lords reform then being contemplated.
Sixth, the availability of a House of Lords veto – a ‘nuclear 
option’ always unlikely to be deployed anyway – was not a 
substitute for meaningful consideration of the principles 
and their realisation, and does not compensate for these 
problems.
26. The experience of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 
suggests a need for a mechanism which:
  Prevents the constitution from being subject to 
the political agenda of the government of the 
day;
  Creates a strong incentive for a government 
to consider the constitutional significance 
of proposals before it announces them, and 
allow for suitable consultation and scrutiny 
procedures;
  Encourages the government to publish an 
assessment of the full constitutional impact of 
its constitutional proposals and how it intends 
to ensure appropriate consultation and scrutiny 
takes place;
  Enables Parliament, when it believes the 
government is not facilitating appropriate 
consultation and scrutiny, to classify a bill as 
of substantial constitutional significance, and 
trigger a mechanism of its own;
  Provides that acknowledgement by the 
government or assertion by Parliament that an 
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Act was of special constitutional significance 
might subsequently be taken into account 
by the courts, particularly in assessments of 
whether the Act was subject to implied repeal 
by a later Act of Parliament.
Distinguishing constitutional laws –  
the definitional approach
27. The government’s principled argument against special 
procedures for constitutional legislation rests on the 
‘problem of the definition of what should be subject to 
special treatment’.22 Two separate questions arise; first, is 
the difficulty of establishing a determinative definition of 
constitutional legislation insuperable and, second, if such a 
definition cannot be found, does it follow that constitutional 
bills cannot be identified and, if Parliament so decides, 
made subject to special legislative procedures?
28. There are at least three alternative approaches to the 
definition of constitutional legislation. One approach is 
to produce a list or catalogue of constitutional subjects. 
Legislation which touches on any of this subject matter 
is defined as constitutional. Professor Sir John Baker has 
proposed the following list of constitutional subject matter 
which has been cited with approval by both the Lords 
Constitution Committee and PCRC in recent reports:23
22 The Government Response to the House of Lords Constitution Committee 
Report, The Process of Constitutional Change, September 2011, Cm 8181, para 
27.
23 House of Lords Constitution Committee 15th Report, July 2011, The Process 
of Constitutional Change, para 11; First Report of Session 2013–14, May 2013, 
Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation, para 139.
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  any alteration to the structure and composition 
of Parliament;
  any alteration to the powers of Parliament, 
or any transfer of power, as by devolution or 
international treaty, which would in practice be 
difficult to reverse;
  any alteration to the succession to the Crown or 
the functions of the monarch;
  any substantial alteration to the balance of power 
between Parliament and government, including 
the conferment of unduly broad or ill-defined 
powers to legislate by order;
  any substantial alteration to the balance of 
power between central government and local 
authorities;
  any substantial alteration to the establishment 
and jurisdiction of the courts of law, including 
any measure that would place the exercise of 
power beyond the purview of the courts, or which 
would affect the independence of the judiciary;
  any substantial alteration to the establishment of 
the Church of England;
  any substantial alteration to the liberties of the 
subject, including the right to habeas corpus and 
trial by jury.24
24 A list of current statutes which satisfy Sir John’s definition appears in the 
Appendix to this paper.
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29. A difficulty with any list of this kind is that it will inevitably 
seem to many people to be either over- or under- inclusive. 
There are also obvious difficulties in the interpretation of 
terms such as ‘substantial’, which must be to some degree 
subjective. We may conclude that a list of constitutional 
subject matter may provide valuable guidance but cannot in 
itself put the question of whether or not a particular piece 
of legislation is constitutional beyond reasonable argument 
and thus cannot be employed in isolation as a determinative 
method.
30. A list of major constitutional statutes is likely to command 
more general consensus. However a list of statutes is of 
limited value in determining whether new legislation is 
constitutional when that legislation may not necessarily 
seek to amend any existing constitutional statute.
31. In his judgment in Thoburn, Laws L.J. proposed a definition 
of constitutional statutes, supported by a short list of 
examples:
In my opinion a constitutional statute is one which 
(a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen 
and State in some general, overarching manner, or 
(b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would 
now regard as fundamental constitutional rights. (a) 
and (b) are of necessity closely related: it is difficult to 
think of an instance of (a) that is not also an instance of 
(b). The special status of constitutional statutes follows 
the special status of constitutional rights. Examples are 
the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of 
Union, the Reform Acts which distributed and enlarged 
the franchise, the HRA, the Scotland Act 1998 and the 
Government of Wales Act 1998. The ECA clearly belongs 
in this family.
29DISTINGUISHING CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION
It is clear that the distinguished judge did not intend this 
to be a comprehensive list of constitutional statutes. In the 
Appendix to this paper, the Constitution Society working 
party has attempted to compile a list of all current statutes 
which are of first class constitutional importance. While 
there may be room for debate at the periphery, it is suggested 
that this list would command fairly general assent.
32. An alternative approach is to apply a very general and cryptic 
definition of constitutional subject matter. Professor David 
Feldman has suggested this approach to the Constitution 
Society working party:
… a constitution’s basic task is to constitute the state by 
creating state institutions and allocating functions to each 
institution. Constitutions are essentially institutional. 
Constitutional legislation, therefore, is legislation which 
establishes or shapes an institution of the state.25
33. A formulation of this kind may seem uncontroversial 
but at the same time provide insufficient guidance on the 
constitutional nature of specific legislation. For example, 
should the voting system (a sub-constitutional matter in 
many democracies with codified constitutions) be viewed as 
constitutional under a definition of this type? And what of 
individual rights, which may not necessarily be connected 
with the functioning of state institutions?
34. Lastly, there is what may be described as the common-sense 
approach. Lord Norton of Louth has proposed a “2Ps” test 
for constitutional legislation: does it affect a principal part 
of the constitution, and does it raise an important issue of 
25 Internal paper, 2013.
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principle. PCRC’s recent report on legislative standards 
recommends that the government applies Lord Norton’s 
“2Ps” test in conjunction with Sir John Baker’s list of 
constitutional matters, when deciding which bills to take to 
a Committee of the Whole House.26
Distinguishing constitutional laws – certification
35. An alternative method of distinguishing constitutional 
legislation is certification. Under a certificatory approach, 
major constitutional legislation is that which is held to 
be so by a certifying authority. A process of certification 
avoids interpretational difficulties but may by its nature 
appear arbitrary. It requires a certifying authority which is 
generally accepted as authoritative and which seeks to apply 
known interpretative principles in a consistent way.
36. In a recent paper27 Professor David Feldman has described 
the approach to distinguishing major constitutional 
legislation which has evolved in Israel, one of the very small 
number of democratic states lacking a codified constitution:
… successive Knessetim have made what they called 
‘Basic Laws’. These are in effect constitutional laws 
which cumulatively contribute to the construction of a 
constitution for the State. Basic Laws have been passed 
by the ordinary legislative procedure and by ordinary 
parliamentary majorities. There was doubt about the 
status of Basic Laws relative to other laws in the State’s 
26 First Report of Session 2013–14, May 2013, Ensuring standards in the quality 
of legislation, para 142.
27 Feldman D, The nature and significance of “constitutional” legislation, paper 
presented at The Society of Legal Scholars’ Conference, September 2012.
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normative hierarchy. In due course the Supreme Court 
of Israel held that Basic Laws have higher, constitutional 
status, and that ordinary laws are invalid if incompatible 
with them. The Court decided that, when passing a 
Basic Law, the Knesset exercises its original function as 
a constituent body for the State of Israel, and as such its 
legislation has higher normative status than Laws which 
it makes in its ordinary, legislative capacity. Laws made 
in the exercise of the constituent power of the Knesset are 
identifiable by their titles; if a law is called a Basic Law, it 
is a Basic Law, regardless of its content or effects.
37. The practice in the United Kingdom Parliament of referring 
bills of first class constitutional importance to a Committee 
of the Whole House relies on a form of certification. When 
viewed from this perspective, the shortcomings of the 
current approach are evident:
  The certification of constitutional bills rests 
solely with the government; Parliament as a 
whole has no opportunity to debate or endorse 
the government’s certificatory decisions.
  The basis on which certificatory decisions 
are made by government is not based on any 
evident or consistent set of principles.
  There is no procedure for certifying secondary 
legislation which has constitutional effects.
  The fact that a bill was certified by government 
to be of first class constitutional importance 
is not evident on the face of the subsequent 
Act. In consequence, if the courts come to 
take the view, following Thoburn, that special 
principles of interpretation should be applied 
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to constitutional legislation, judges are left 
to decide for themselves whether or not a 
particular statute is constitutional, without 
guidance from Parliament.
A modest proposal
38. Is there a method of distinguishing legislation of first 
class constitutional importance which could be applied by 
Parliament using existing procedures? Furthermore, are 
there existing procedures which would allow Parliament, if 
it so decided, to apply special legislative processes to such 
legislation, including subordinate legislation (other than 
the existing convention of referral to a Committee of the 
Whole House)?
39. One way forward would be to abandon any attempt at an 
exhaustive definition of first class constitutional legislation, 
along with any attempt to enshrine any such definition 
in a statute binding on the world outside the legislature, 
but instead to empower a committee in each House, 
first, to determine whether a bill contained provisions of 
constitutional significance and, second, to propose ways 
in which those provisions should be dealt with. Although 
such an approach might to begin with operate without a 
determinate set of principles, the mere fact that, unlike the 
current system, it would cause a public record to be created, 
would itself be an improvement, and might eventually lead 
to a form of ‘case law’ out of which principles might emerge. 
Furthermore, it could be applied to secondary legislation, 
at least if sufficient resources were devoted to the process. 
And although the face of the Bill would not include a 
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statement that the committee had classified a proposal as 
constitutionally significant, it might be possible later to 
develop, perhaps by statute, a process under which, just as a 
Secretary of State has to certify that a bill does not infringe 
human rights,28 the committee has to certify that a bill does 
or does not have constitutional significance.
40. The principal advantage of such a procedure would be 
its flexibility. The fact that there are different kinds of 
‘constitutional’ proposal of different degrees of importance 
and difficulty could be taken into account in the way the 
committee might propose that they be handled. The 
committee would not be limited to the existing procedure 
of committing the bill to a Committee of the Whole House 
but would have a range of possible procedures from which 
to choose.
Which committee?
41. A number of reasonable options exist for resolving the issue 
of which committee should be assigned the task of deciding 
whether provisions of a bill have constitutional significance 
and what modifications should be made in the way they are 
handled. Several existing committees might be considered 
suitable but it might be best to establish new committees 
specifically for this purpose.
42. One option would be to use PCRC in the Commons and 
the Constitution Committee in the Lords. These committees 
have the advantage of existing expertise. The objection 
might be raised, however, that departmental or thematic 
28 Human Rights Act 1998, s.19.
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select committees do their best work when they operate 
on a cross-party, less partisan basis, so that inserting an 
element of regular potentially contentious business into 
their schedules might bring with it a danger of undermining 
their working style. Another option from among existing 
bodies is the Commons Procedure Committee, also 
expert in a relevant field, albeit also arguably better left 
uncontaminated by regular contentious business.
43. A different option for the Commons would be the 
Backbench Business Committee, whose principal task 
is the allocation of backbench time in the House and in 
Westminster Hall. The Backbench Business Committee is 
certainly accustomed to contentious business – applications 
for backbench debates regularly exceed the available time 
– and it is increasingly adroit in its use of procedure. The 
objection to using it for the present purpose, however, 
would be that its principal responsibility is to backbenchers 
and that assigning it a general constitutional task would be 
a diversion.
44. A third option would be the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, which reports to both Houses on the human rights 
implications of all bills. It has the considerable advantage 
of being used to working with great rapidity on new bills 
and its expertise is certainly relevant, albeit narrower than 
the full range of possible constitutional issues. There are, 
however, two objections to its use: first, precisely because 
it currently examines every bill, its workload is very heavy 
and adding to it might not be advisable; and second it is 
a joint committee of both Houses, so that some would 
complain about members of the unelected House having 
influence over proceedings in the elected House.
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45. Other options exist. The Committee of Privileges, for 
example, has some relevant expertise and is accustomed 
to contention, though perhaps in neither case of exactly 
the right kind. One might also consider the Committee of 
Selection, the committee which controls the membership 
of general committees including bill committees, and so is 
familiar with the right part of parliamentary procedure. At 
the moment, however, it suffers from the grave defect that 
it is not elected by the House but rather nominated by the 
Whips, who often nominate themselves. In the Lords, one 
might propose using the Delegated Powers and Regulatory 
Reform Committee, which already looks at bills for 
constitutional implications.
46. It might be best, however, to create committees specifically 
for the task. In the Commons the committee would be 
elected according to the existing procedures for select 
committees, namely that the chair would be elected by the 
whole House and the membership for each party elected by 
democratic internal procedures.29
What powers should the committee have?
47. The principal power any such committee would need would 
be a power to put down procedural motions and amendments 
concerning how the House deals with a bill. In the current 
procedure in the Commons, the almost invariable practice 
is to take such motions immediately after second reading, 
so that the committee would have to complete its work 
between the publication of a bill (which for a government 
29 SO 122B and resolution of 4 March 2010 (HC Deb, 3 March 2010, col 1095).
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bill usually coincides with first reading) and the day before 
second reading. That is a tight timetable, although by no 
means impossible for a committee charged with no other 
business. It might, however, be necessary to empower the 
committee not only to put down but also to be able to force 
onto the agenda a motion to delay consideration of the 
second reading for a short period to allow it properly to 
consider a bill.
48. A related problem with the existing procedure is that 
because procedural handling is decided after second 
reading, the House has already decided that it is in favour 
of the principle of a bill before deciding how further to 
debate it. It might instead be thought desirable for there to 
be a period of consultation on the principle of the bill itself, 
rather than merely on its detailed provisions. The Coalition 
Agreement itself proposed that such a ‘public reading stage’ 
might be included in the procedure for ordinary bills,30 and 
so the case for its inclusion in constitutionally significant 
bills might be thought even stronger. Admittedly, in the 
few bills in which the government has inserted such a 
stage it was not completed in time for the second reading 
debate and the government asserted that the procedure 
was designed to allow public comments to influence the 
committee and report stage debates only.31 But one might 
argue that the bills themselves, especially the Protection 
of Freedom Bill 2011, consisted of a list of very specific 
proposals and did not lend themselves to a consultation 
30 The Coalition: our programme for government (HM Government: 
London, 2011), para 27.
31 House of Commons Library, Public Reading Stage of Bills, SN/PC/06406, 
22 August 2012, p7.
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about overall principle. As a result, one might also want 
the committee charged with considering the constitutional 
significance of bills to have a power to put down and have 
debated a motion before second reading that there should be 
a public reading stage on a bill.
49. The precise content of the committee’s proposals should be a 
matter for the committee itself. It would want to consider, for 
example, whether there should be public hearings on a bill, 
whether after such hearings the bill should be considered 
by a Committee of the Whole House or by a public bill 
committee (or divided between the two, as already happens 
for many bills, especially Finance Bills) and whether there 
was sufficient time for the bill to be debated properly. The 
committee might also propose that no further proceedings 
on the bill should take place until the government published 
a white paper setting out the objectives of the proposal and 
its constitutional impact.
Would it make any difference?
50. One obvious objection to the proposal is that it would make 
no difference. In the Commons, the committee, in line with 
standard practice, would reflect the political composition 
of the House and so would normally have a majority of 
government supporters. Moreover, the committee would 
only be able to propose motions and amendments to the 
House. The House would decide whether to adopt them and, 
again in normal circumstances, the government would have 
a majority. Such is the nature of parliamentary democracy.
51. The point should not, however, be taken too far. Recent 
parliaments have seen a remarkable rise in backbench 
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rebelliousness.32 The days of almost military discipline, 
which characterised the post-war years, have entirely gone. 
Some try to explain the rise of rebellion by pointing to a 
renewed sensitivity of MPs to the views of constituents and 
to social media, but that would not explain, for example, 
the enormous Conservative revolt on House of Lords 
reform, which seems to have been entirely self-started. 
That revolt is particularly significant not just because it 
was on a constitutional issue but also because it threatened 
the vital interests of the Conservative Party by prompting 
the Liberal Democrats to withdraw support for boundary 
changes that would have put the Conservatives in a much 
stronger position to win the 2015 election. The Conservative 
leadership seems to have lost control of its party on precisely 
the kind of issue that the party whip is supposed to deliver.
52. Moreover, the mere possibility or threat of revolt is often a 
potent political force in itself, leading governments to alter 
course in anticipation of problems. As a result the influence 
of a committee with the power to propose motions and 
amendments might well be invisible to the naked eye but it 
would nonetheless be important.
53. Finally, even if a government feels that it has to reject the 
committee’s recommendations and is able to fight off any 
rebellion without making concessions, it would have been 
drawn into explicit and extensive debate on the issues, the 
content of which might be useful on other occasions and in 
the House of Lords, where the government has no majority.
32 See eg Cowley P and Stuart M, Parliament still remains on course 
to be the most rebellious since 1945, Political Insight, 14 May 2013, 
http://www.psa.ac.uk/political-insight/blog/parliament-still-remains- 
course-be-most-rebellious-1945.
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Practicality
54. Another objection to establishing such a committee would 
be practicality. There is the issue of whether the committee 
would be able to do its job in time (or, alternatively, an issue 
of whether undue delay might be caused for bills of no 
constitutional significance). The objection, however, is not 
a strong one. Most bills have no constitutional significance 
at all and could be dealt with rapidly, and in the case of bills 
with constitutional significance, the question is not one of 
the substance of the proposals but merely how they are dealt 
with procedurally.
55. A problem might arise, however, if secondary legislation 
is brought into the picture. Hundreds, or even thousands, 
of such measures are proposed every year, and the job of 
checking each one for constitutional implications would be 
immense. One possible way of dealing with the problem, 
however, might be to use an existing Lords committee, 
previously the Committee on the Merits of Statutory 
Instruments, now called the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny 
Committee, which already examines secondary legislation, 
and ask it to bring to the attention of the Commons and 
Lords committees on constitutional significance any 
measures it considers worthy of their attention.
56. A final point concerns private members bills. There is no 
reason in principle why private member’s bills should be 
excluded from the committees’ scope – it is, for example, 
quite astonishing that a bill to hold a referendum on a matter 
of vast constitutional importance such as membership of the 
European Union can make its way through the Commons 
on the same basis as the Margaret Thatcher Day Bill. But 
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there is a practical problem. Although the procedures of 
the Commons mean that the committee will have plenty of 
notice of the second readings of private member’s bills, there 
is a potential difficulty that since there is in principle no limit 
to the number of private member’s bills that can be put down, 
the committee might be swamped by proposals that have no 
chance of being passed. The practical way out of the problem 
is to ensure that the committee has discretion to spend no 
time on bills with little chance of receiving a second reading.
Political will
57. The remaining objection to the proposal is simply that it 
has no chance of being adopted by government, for the 
straightforward reason that it involves giving power away. 
It is no doubt true that governments rarely support reforms 
of this kind, even more rarely later than the first year of a 
government’s existence. It is worth noting, however, that 
the means now exist for effecting such a change without 
the government’s support. Backbench business includes 
motions to change standing orders,33 and the Backbench 
Business Committee has already put forward such motions, 
which the House has passed.34 All that is really required is 
sufficient political will by members themselves.
58. The Backbench Business Committee is entitled to determine 
the business of the House on 27 days in each session (SO 
14(4)). It may put down for decision any matter that falls 
33 Howarth D, The Backbench Business Committee of the House of Commons 
[2011] Public Law 490–98 – changes to the powers of the Backbench Business 
Committee itself are excepted.
34 Ibid.
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within the definition of ‘backbench business’ (SO 14(4)). 
‘Backbench business’ is defined by SO 14(7) as any business 
except for a specific list of matters. That list includes ‘any 
motion to amend this order or Standing Order No. 152J 
(Backbench Business Committee)’, but not does not include 
any other type of amendment to Standing Orders.35 That 
means that motions to amend Standing Orders other than 
SO 14 and SO 152J are within the definition of ‘backbench 
business’, which includes amendments changing the powers 
of an existing committee or bringing new ones into existence. 
Standing Orders were in fact amended during time allotted 
to the Backbench Business Committee on 2 December 2010, 
when the House changed the powers of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Standards and the powers of the Public 
Accounts Committee.36
Conclusion
59. This report has set out the current approach to legislation of a 
constitutional nature within the UK system, and in particular 
35 The full list of exceptions is: (a) government business, that is proceedings 
relating to government bills, financial business, proceedings under any Act of 
Parliament, or relating to European Union Documents, or any other motion in 
the name of a Minister of the Crown; (b) opposition business under paragraph 
(2) above; (c) motions for the adjournment of the House under paragraph (7) 
of Standing Order No. 9 (Sittings of the House), private Members’ motions 
for leave to bring in bills under Standing Order No. 23 (Motions for leave to 
bring in bills and nomination of select committees at commencement of public 
business) and private Members’ bills under paragraphs (9) to (14) below; (d) 
proceedings relating to private business; (e) any motion to amend this order 
or Standing Order No. 152J (Backbench Business Committee); (f) business set 
down at the direction of, or given precedence by, the Speaker.
36 Hansard, HC Deb Vol 519 cols 995–1017 (2 December 2010) (amending SO 
150) and col 1074 (amending SO 148). See Howarth D, The House of Commons 
Backbench Business Committee [2011] Public Law 490–98.
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within Parliament. It has identified the deficiencies 
contained in present practices, particularly when placed in 
international perspective. The UK constitution is vulnerable 
to abuse. Governments, driven by partisan considerations, 
are able to force onto the statute book poorly conceived 
measures changing the fabric of our constitution, subject 
only to minimal consultation and limited scrutiny. We 
have considered a range of different approaches that might 
ensure constitutional change is more sensitively handled. 
Finally, the report has set out a modest proposal for change, 
through a development of the parliamentary committee 
system. A better way of handling constitutional legislation 
is already within the grasp of Parliament, if it wants it.
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Appendix a
Membership of The Constitution Society expert working party 
on definition of constitutional legislation, sitting during 2012–13.
Prof. Sir John Baker
Dr. Andrew Blick
Prof. Linda Colley
Prof. David Feldman
Richard Gordon QC
David Howarth
Nat le Roux
(Lord) Robert Maclennan
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Appendix b
Constitutional statutes which satisfy Sir John Baker’s criteria
  Scotland Act 2012
  Public Bodies Act 2011
  Localism Act 2011
  Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011
  European Union Act 2011
  Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011
  Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010
  Parliamentary Standards Act 2009
  European Union (Amendment) Act 2008
  Further Education and Training Act 2007
  Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007
  Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006
  Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006
  Government of Wales Act 2006
  Terrorism Act 2006
  Equality Act 2006
  Constitutional Reform Act 2005
  Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
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  Civil Contingencies Act 2004
  Scottish Parliament (Constituencies) Act 2004
  Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002?
  European Communities (Amendment) Act 2002
  House of Commons (Removal of Clergy Disqualification) 
Act 2001
  Regulatory Reform Act 2001
  Disqualifications Act 2000
  Freedom of Information Act 2000
  Local Government Act 2000
  Terrorism Act 2000
  House of Lords Act 1999
  Greater London Authority Act 1999
  Northern Ireland Act 1998
  Scotland Act 1998
  Human Rights Act 1998
  Government of Wales Act 1998
  European Communities (Amendment) Act 1998
  Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998
  Bank of England Act 1998
  Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1998
  Greater London Authority (Referendum) Act 1998
  Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997
  Public Order Act 1986
  Canada Act 1982
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  Supreme Court Act 1981 [now renamed the Senior Courts 
Act 1981]
  House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975
  Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973
  European Communities Act 1972
  Emergency Powers Act 1964
  Life Peerages Act 1958
  Ireland Act 1949
  Crown Proceedings Act 1947
  Royal Titles Act 1953
  Regency Acts 1937 – 53
  Declaration of Abdication Act 1936
  Statute of Westminster 1931
  Parliament Acts 1949
  Parliament Acts 1911
  Treaty of Union With Ireland Act 1800
  Act of Union 1707
  Act of Settlement 1700
  Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689
  Bill of Rights and Claim of Right 1689
Statutes which do not satisfy Sir John’s criteria but which are 
arguably constitutional
  Equality Act 2010
  Political Parties and Elections Act 2009
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  Northern Ireland Act 2009
  Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2007
  Electoral Administration Act 2006
  Regional Assemblies (Preparations) Act 2003
  European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003
  European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002
  Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000
  Representation of the People Act 2000
  European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999
  British Nationality Act 1981
  Ministerial and Other Salaries Act 1975
  Representation of the People Acts
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